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Not all that begins in hope ends in happiness. In Egypt, the 
exuberance of Tahrir Square has given way to frustration over the 
resilience of the security state;1 in Libya, the anti-Qaddafi movement 
has fractured along tribal and factional lines;2 in Syria, as of this 
 
 *  Rosa Brooks is Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center 
and a Schwartz Senior Fellow at the New America Foundation. From 2009 to 
2011, Brooks served as Counselor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 
and Special Coordinator for Rule of Law at the U.S. Department of Defense. 
 1. See, e.g., Sarah Topol, The Opposition in Egypt Splinters and Sputter, N.Y. 
TIMES LATITUDE BLOG (June 8, 2012, 9:02 AM), http://latitude.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2012/06/08/the-opposition-in-egypt-splinters-and-sputters (describing the Egyptian 
opposition as fragmented in their efforts to unite around a presidential candidate 
and stating that the opposition’s failure to do so has inhibited their ability to 
rebuild the Egyptian government). 
 2. See, e.g., David D. Kirkpatrick, Libya Postpones National Election Until 
July, as Preparations Lag, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2012/06/11/world/africa/libya-to-delay-national-election.html?_r=1&partner=rss& 
emc=rss (noting that hostility toward the interim authorities has caused elections to 
be postponed, that there are disagreements over the distribution of delegates, and 
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writing, calls for reform continue to be met with gunfire from 
government forces.3 Throughout the Middle East—from Egypt, 
Libya, and Syria to Yemen, Tunisia, Bahrain, and elsewhere—the 
heady excitement of 2010 has given way to a more sober awareness 
that enduring political change may take years, if not generations.4 
The Arab Spring brought both progress and turmoil, and its long-
term impact remains uncertain. 
For international law, the import of the Arab Spring is similarly 
ambiguous. On the one hand, as Juan Mendez and others have 
argued,5 the Arab Spring can be viewed as the world’s first true 
human rights revolution: the young protesters of the Arab street 
spoke the language of democracy and human rights, and the 
international community responded in the same lexicon, with 
references to human rights law and international criminal law, and 
referrals to the institutions that help sustain them (such as the UN 
Human Rights Council and the International Criminal Court 
(“ICC”)).6 Many human rights advocates rejoiced when the UN 
 
that local militia have detained staff members of the International Criminal Court, 
stifling efforts to bring Qaddafi to court). 
 3. See, e.g., Neil MacFarquhar, Syrian Forces Shell Cities as Opposition 
Picks Leader, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/11/ 
world/middleeast/syrian-forces-shell-cities-as-opposition-picks-leader.html. 
 4. See, e.g., Michael Slackman, Bullets Stall Youthful Push for Arab Spring, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/18/world/ 
middleeast/18youth.html?pagewanted=all (recounting how young people have 
used social media to organize revolutions in the Arab Spring, and noting that the 
youth who once led the peaceful protests now must often focus on defending 
themselves and the movement from aggressors); see also Interview by Marc Hall 
with Pilar Morales, Head of Strategic Planning & Res. Mobilization, Council of 
Europe (Sept. 7, 2012), available at http://www.euractiv.com/global-europe/ 
council-europe-advisor-political-interview-514700 (explaining that the Council of 
Europe understands that the Arab Spring, and specifically in the southern 
Mediterranean, will take years to be fully realized). 
 5. Juan Mendez, Professor, Am. Univ., Remarks at the American University 
International Law Review Symposium: The Impact of the Arab Spring Throughout 
the Middle East & Northern Africa (Feb. 14, 2012); see also Diane Orentlicher, 
Professor, Am. Univ., Remarks at the American University International Law 
Review Symposium: The Impact of the Arab Spring Throughout the Middle East 
& Northern Africa (Feb. 14, 2012). 
 6. See Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly Suspends Libya 
from Human Rights Council; Hopes of Libyan People ‘Must Not be Dashed’ 
Assembly President Says, As Secretary-General Voices ‘Grave Concern’ at 
Ongoing Violence Against Civilians, para. 3, U.N. Press Release GA/11050 (Mar. 
1, 2011) (“The world has spoken with one voice: we demand an immediate end to 
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Security Council referred the situation in Libya to the ICC and when 
the Libya intervention was justified in terms of the international 
“responsibility to protect” (“R2P”).7 To the optimist, these 
developments reflect the renewed vitality of international legal 
institutions and will further speed the development of human rights–
related international legal norms. 
On the other hand, the Arab Spring demonstrated equally the 
limits and dangers of these same institutions and norms. At the 
outset, it’s probably worth noting the early irrelevance of 
international law and institutions to the Arab Spring. For most of the 
last few decades, international law and institutions did little or 
nothing to improve conditions in the Arab World. Indeed, the 
repressive regimes of the Middle East were always asterisks to the 
global trend toward democratization; even as autocratic regimes in 
Latin America, Russia, and Eastern Europe tumbled, oil-rich Arab 
political leaders clung to power, with little protest from the United 
States or other powerful nations. As long as the oil flowed, few 
wealthy states were inclined to push too hard for reform. It’s 
unsurprising, then, that change ultimately came from within, not 
from without. The starring roles in the Arab Spring have been played 
not by international actors but by the citizens of the Arab World 
themselves—by street vendors, students, tech entrepreneurs, and 
other ordinary people. International institutions—and certainly 
powerful nations such as the United States—have been followers, not 
leaders.  
When changing facts on the ground meant that the Security 
Council and its five permanent members could no longer ignore the 
Arab Spring, their response was equivocal. The Council referred 
Libya to the International Criminal Court8 but provided no additional 
resources to assist the already-overwhelmed prosecutor with his 
 
the violence against civilians and full respect for their fundamental human rights, 
including those of peaceful assembly and free speech”); see also Andrew Porter, 
Arab Spring Will Add to Extremism if We Do Not Help, Says David Cameron, 
TELEGRAPH (May 27, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/david-
cameron/8539420/Arab-Spring-will-add-to-extremism-if-we-do-not-help-says-
David-Cameron.html (advocating that extremism and mass immigration will 
prevail if protestors are not supported in their quest for democracy). 
 7. S.C. Res. 1970, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (2011) (Feb. 26, 2011); S.C. Res. 
1973, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (2011) (Mar. 17, 2011). 
 8. S.C. Res. 1970 (2011), supra note 7, ¶ 4. 
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investigations, making effective ICC action difficult. Blessed by the 
Security Council, NATO intervened militarily in Libya to protect the 
civilian population from predation by Qaddafi’s forces,9 but the 
international community showed little interest in providing 
substantial financial or governance assistance to the Libyan 
opposition once Qaddafi was overthrown.10  
The Security Council has shown even less interest in using 
military force to protect civilians in Bahrain or Syria: in Bahrain, 
U.S. security considerations militate against anything that could 
threaten the Bahrain-based headquarters of the Navy’s Fifth Fleet,11 
while in Syria, Russian opposition and U.S. concerns about military 
overextension have so far squelched serious discussion of using force 
to protect Syrian civilians.12 As the R2P in Libya morphed from 
civilian protection to regime change—and as political considerations 
appeared to trump humanitarian considerations in Bahrain, Syria, and 
elsewhere—early claims about the triumphant operationalization of 
the R2P began to ring hollow.13 
 
 9. S.C. Res. 1973 (2011), supra note 7. 
 10. See Gaddafi’s Regime Looks Like a Beacon of Light Compared to the 
Current Gov’t, RT (Oct. 8, 2012), http://rt.com/news/bani-walid-gaddafi-libya-
944/ (criticizing the United Nations for failing to assist the residents of Bani Walid 
under siege and for its inability to create a legitimate post-Gaddafi government); 
see also Marie-Louise Gumuchian, Shattered Gaddafi Town Says Forgotten in 
New Libya, REUTERS, Feb. 29, 2012, available at http://af.reuters.com/ 
article/worldNews/idAF TRE81S0 TN20120229 (discussing the challenges the 
Libyan city of Sirte has undergone since revolution and reporting that the town has 
not received any official support to rebuild its city other than humanitarian aid). 
 11. See Ali Al-Ahmed, Limited Options for the U.S., N.Y. TIMES ROOM FOR 
DEBATE BLOG (May 30, 2012, 1:36 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/ 
2012/05/29/nudging-bahrain-without-pushing-it-away/limited-options-for-the-us-
in-bahrain (stating that the United States has not attempted to bring Bahrain before 
the UN Security Council, supports Bahrain’s monarchy, and has not pressed for 
sanctions against Bahrain for its human rights violations). 
 12. See Patrick Wintour & Ewen MacAskill, Obama Fails to Secure Support 
from Putin on Solution to Syria Crisis, GUARDIAN (June 18, 2012), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/18/obama-support-putin-syria-g20 
(noting that Russia is reluctant to break its alliance with Syria and describing 
disagreement between U.S. President Obama and Russian President Putin 
regarding supporting a regime change in Syria). 
 13. Compare Romesh Ratnesar, Libya: The Case for U.S. Intervention, TIME 
(Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.time.com/ time/nation/article/0,8599,2057470,00.html 
(arguing that using the R2P principle can strategically benefit the United States 
because it shows support for democratic movements in Muslim countries while 
allowing the United States to limit its involvement), with Michelle Nichols, U.N. 
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Nonetheless, the international legal response to the Arab Spring 
may prove more portentous in the long run than in the short run. 
True, R2P may have been operationalized only in an equivocal 
manner, but the fact that it was invoked at all may reflect a 
substantial shift in the international consensus on sovereignty, 
intervention, and the use of force. This is particularly true when 
one considers that the emergence and operationalization of R2P,14 
with its sovereignty-limiting logic, has been paralleled by similar 
shifts in security-based assertions about sovereignty and the use of 
force.   
As I will explain, evolving ideas about sovereignty—coming from 
both the humanitarian discourse and the counterterrorism 
discourse—suggest a shift away from traditional assumptions about 
the right of a sovereign state to be free of external interference in its 
internal affairs, and toward more permissive norms relating to 
interventions and the use of force. This trend is exacerbated by 
significant improvements in surveillance and weapons-delivery 
technologies—specifically, through the use of unmanned aerial 
vehicles (“UAVs”), more commonly known as “drones.” These 
technological changes, in combination with changes in international 
norms relating to sovereignty and the use of force, may serve to 
reduce the political and economic costs of military interventions for 
powerful states. By so doing, they profoundly challenge the 
collective security structure created by the UN Charter and call into 
question international law’s ability to meaningfully constrain the use 
of force at all.  
 
Chief Says Security Council Paralysis Harming Syrian People, REUTERS (Sept. 5, 
2012) (discussing that, while there have been successes in the context of R2P, 
“these efforts will not avert the worst if they are not accompanied by action by 
influential Governments to find a political solution. The Council’s paralysis does 
the Syrian people harm. It also damages its own credibility and weakens a concept 
that was adopted with such hope and expectations”). 
 14. See generally 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶¶ 138–40, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005) (declaring that each state must protect its 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against 
humanity, and that the “international community” may intervene when a state fails 
to do so); U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, 
U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009) [hereinafter Implementing the Responsibility 
to Protect] (outlining the processes and procedures for R2P intervention as a three-
pillar strategy). 
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I. CHANGES IN NORMATIVE UNDERSTANDINGS 
OF SOVEREIGNTY 
Let me take a step back and say more about recent shifts in 
normative conceptions of sovereignty—shifts in which the 
emergence of the R2P construct plays a significant role. The last two 
decades have seen a dramatic shift away from traditional, 
Westphalian ideas about state sovereignty. Increasingly, both legal 
scholars and national and international-level advocates and political 
decision-makers have articulated an understanding of state 
sovereignty as limited and subject to what amounts to de facto 
waiver.15 In this vision of sovereignty, sovereignty is less a right 
inherent in all states than a privilege that must be earned through 
good behavior. A state is required to execute certain 
responsibilities.16 If it fails to do so, external actors have a right—
perhaps an obligation—to step in themselves to ensure proper 
execution of its responsibilities.  
In the human rights community, this vision of sovereignty is often 
couched in terms of atrocity prevention and R2P. As noted, this 
vision came to the fore during the Arab Spring in reaction to the 
actions of Moamar Qaddafi. But during the years immediately 
preceding the Arab Spring, parallel versions of this argument also 
emerged from within the national security community. Here, the 
argument has generally been couched in terms of state duties to 
prevent the export of terrorism, and while it originated during the 
Bush Administration, it has been elaborated most explicitly by 
 
 15. See generally U.N. Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared 
Responsibility: Rep. of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 
2004; David Aronofsky, The International Legal Responsibility to Protect Against 
Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: Why National Sovereignty 
Does Not Preclude Its Exercise, 13 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 317 (2007); 
Catherine Powell, Libya: A Multilateral Constitutional Moment?, 106 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 298 (2012). 
 16. G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 14, ¶ 138 (requiring states to prevent and protect 
their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against 
humanity “through appropriate and necessary means”); Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect, supra note 14, ¶¶ 13–27 (describing states’ responsibility 
to foster respect among disparate groups, protect human rights, become parties to 
relevant international agreements, assist the International Criminal Court in 
apprehending individuals within their states, prevent massive crimes, regularly 
assess their internal mechanisms, and encourage individual responsibility). 
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members of the Obama Administration in 2011 and 2012.17 Even as 
drone strikes in Libya helped operationalize R2P, drone strikes in 
Yemen, Pakistan, and elsewhere have begun to operationalize a 
counterterrorism-driven shift in conceptions of sovereignty. 
A. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 
Since World War II, international law has struggled to address the 
tensions between Westphalian sovereignty, human rights, and 
increased globalization. The UN Charter reflects these tensions; even 
as it introduces the notion of universal human rights and empowers 
the Security Council to use force in the name of international peace 
and security, it emphasizes that, aside from such enforcement 
actions, the United Nations is not to “intervene in matters which are 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.”18 For 
decades, states wishing to fend off inquiries into their human rights 
practices used the principle of sovereign non-intervention as a shield, 
asserting that such inquiries represent unwarranted interference in 
their domestic affairs.19  
By the beginning of the 1990s, this position had become more 
difficult to maintain, as the rising number of multilateral human 
rights treaties began to “internationalize” previously domestic 
matters. (In international trade and economics, multinational treaty 
regimes similarly internationalized large swathes of economic 
policy.) In the 1990s, ethnic cleansing, torture, massacres, and 
genocide in the Balkans and Rwanda further eroded international 
support for traditional principles of sovereign non-interference. By 
the late 1990s, debates about the legality and morality of 
“humanitarian intervention” had taken center stage in international 
law reviews and in international fora such as the UN.  
 
 17. See Steven R. Weisman, Bush Defends His Goal of Spreading Democracy 
to the Mideast, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/ 
27/politics/27diplo.html?_r=0&pagewanted=print; see also Hillary Rodham 
Clinton, Secretary of State, Remarks at the Munich Security Conference Plenary 
Session (Feb. 5, 2011), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/02/ 
156044.htm. 
 18. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7. 
 19. Consider China’s attitude toward Western criticism of its human rights 
practices. See, e.g., Chris Buckley, China Tells U.S. to Quit as Human Rights 
Judge, REUTERS, Apr. 10, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/ 
04/10/us-china-usa-rights-idUSTRE7382EH20110410. 
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By the beginning of the twenty-first century, the 1990s’ debates 
over humanitarian intervention had shifted into a discussion of the 
so-called R2P, a doctrine initially developed by the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (“ICISS”). 
ICISS—initially an initiative of the Canadian government—was 
tasked with reflecting on a decade of atrocities and the varying 
international response to genocide and ethnic cleansing.20 (In Bosnia, 
a NATO-led military intervention was authorized by the UN Security 
Council; in Rwanda, the international community stood idly by as 
close to a million people were slaughtered; in Kosovo, NATO 
intervened to prevent ethnic cleansing without Security Council 
authorization, and the intervention was generally viewed as 
appropriate, even if arguably illegal.)  
ICISS sought to come to terms with this ambiguous legacy by 
offering a quite different vision of sovereignty from that taken for 
granted prior to World War II. In a 2011 report, ICISS asserted that 
“State sovereignty implies responsibility . . . [w]here a population is 
suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, 
repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or 
unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to 
the international responsibility to protect.”21 
ICISS took pains to observe that the responsibility to protect might 
involve the use of many measures short of military force, from 
humanitarian aid to economic sanctions. The use of force to protect 
populations should be a last resort, emphasized the ICISS report, and 
any R2P-based military interventions should be authorized by the 
Security Council.22 But it’s important to emphasize that in the 
aftermath of Rwanda and Kosovo, ICISS was unwilling to view 
Security Council authorization as an absolute requirement:  
If the Security Council rejects a proposal [to intervene to protect a 
population] or fails to deal with it in a reasonable time, alternative 
options . . . [include] action within area of jurisdiction by regional or sub-
 
 20. See INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 81 (2001), available at http://responsibilitytoprotect 
.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf (explaining that the Commission was formed to build 
consensus among the international community to address massive human rights 
violations). 
 21. Id. at XI. 
 22. Id. at XII. 
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regional organizations under Chapter VIII of the Charter, subject to their 
seeking subsequent authorization.23  
“Subsequent authorization” is hardly a Charter-based procedure, 
but here ICISS appears to have been recalling NATO’s intervention 
during the 1999 Kosovo crisis. After all, noted the ICISS report, if 
the Security Council “fails to discharge its responsibility to protect in 
conscience-shocking situations crying out for action . . . concerned 
states may not rule out other means to meet the gravity and urgency 
of that situation . . . .”24 In Kosovo, concerned states did not rule out 
such “other means.” 
In relatively short order, the R2P concept gained substantial 
traction throughout the international community. It was referenced in 
the 2005 UN World Summit Outcome Document and embraced by 
senior U.S. officials.25 Its first serious trial run came in early 2011, 
when the Arab Spring hit Libya—and Moamar Qaddafi predictably 
responded to protests and a nascent insurgency with threats of 
indiscriminate force. His forces, he promised, would go “door to 
door,” executing the “cockroaches,” while his son Saif accused the 
protestors of “trying to imitate what is happening in Tunisia and 
Egypt.”26 Meanwhile, news outlets reported that Libyan government 
forces were using fighter jets to strafe crowds of civilian protestors.27 
 
 23. See id. at XIII. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 14, ¶¶ 138–39 (stating that each individual 
state and the international community have the responsibility to protect populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity). 
 26. See Libya Protests: Defiant Gaddafi Refuses to Quit, BBC NEWS (Feb. 22, 
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12544624 (recounting 
Qaddafi’s first speech in response to protests, in which he referred to Chinese 
authorities’ crushing of protests in Tiananmen Square as an example of action 
necessary to preserve national unity); Vivienne Walt, Libya: Gaddafi’s Son Warns 
Against Protests in TV Speech, TIME (Feb. 21, 2011), http://www.time.com/ 
time/world/article/0,8599,2052842,00.html (reporting that Saif al-Islam, Qaddafi’s 
heir apparent, made a speech in which he blamed a plot against Libya for the 
protests and scolded young people trying to imitate protestors in Tunisia and 
Egypt). 
 27. See, e.g., David Kirkpatrick & Mona El-Naggar, Qaddafi’s Grip Falters as 
His Forces Take on Protestors, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/22/world/africa/22libya.html (“Roving the 
streets in trucks, [Qaddafi’s forces] shot freely as planes dropped what witnesses 
described as ‘small bombs’ and helicopters fired on protesters.”). 
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As President Obama later put it, by attacking his own citizens, 
Qaddafi “lost the confidence of his people and the legitimacy to 
lead,” and the “responsibilities to defend the Libyan people” fell 
upon the international community.28 The Security Council accepted 
the same logic, authorizing, in Resolution 1973, the use of force to 
protect civilians in Libya.29   
This was not the end of the story, of course. Although the Arab 
Spring gave rise to the first full-scale R2P-based international 
intervention in the affairs of a sovereign state, the doctrine (or 
“emerging international norm,” as U.S. Ambassador to the United 
Nations Susan Rice carefully phrased it)30 was soon deployed again 
by the Security Council in Resolution 1975, authorizing the use of 
force in Cote D’Ivoire.31 R2P has also been invoked in the context of 
Syria to justify sanctions and other non-military actions.32  
Although (so far) there has been no international appetite for 
military intervention in Syria, it’s clear that that the R2P genie is out 
of the bottle: the world’s leading powers have declared, individually 
and through the Security Council, that sovereignty implies a legal 
duty to protect civilian populations, and that states that fail in this 
 
 28. Barack Obama, President, Address to the Nation on Libya (Mar. 28, 2011), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/28/remarks-
president-address-nation-libya (counting the international coalition to defend the 
Libyan people as including the United Kingdom, France, Denmark, Norway, Italy, 
Spain, Greece, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar). 
 29. See S.C. Res. 1973 (2011), supra note 7, ¶ 4 (authorizing Member States 
“to take all necessary measures . . . to protect civilians and civilian populated areas 
under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while 
excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan 
territory.”). 
 30. See Susan E. Rice, Why Darfur Can’t Be Left to Africa, WASH. POST (Aug. 
7, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/05/ 
AR2005080501988.html (suggesting that the R2P doctrine be applied to genocide 
in Darfur). 
 31. See S.C. Res. 1975, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1975 (2011) (Mar. 30, 2011) 
(authorizing the United Nations Operations in Cote D’Ivoire “to use all necessary 
means to carry out its mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat of 
violence . . . .”). 
 32. See, e.g., Bennett Ramberg, Applying the Responsibility to Protect to Syria, 
YALE GLOBAL ONLINE (Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/ 
applying-responsibility-protect-syria (proposing R2P actions that the international 
community may take in Syria, including amnesty to Syrian forces who defect, 
lobbying Russia and China to support R2P, and molding of the divided opposition 
forces into a united interim government). 
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duty can no longer assume a sovereign right to be free of outside 
interference, including the use of force.  
To date, all uses of force in the name of R2P have had Security 
Council authorization. But while most post-ICISS elaborations of 
R2P have—for obvious reasons—tended to downplay the possibility 
of military interventions undertaken without Security Council 
authorization, the normative logic of R2P suggests that ICISS was 
right to conclude that Security Council authorization should not be 
dispositive.  
Indeed, the R2P framework implies that the lawfulness of state 
authority is dependent on the capacity and will to protect populations 
from at least certain kinds of egregious harms. If sovereignty 
involves a responsibility to protect, and a state’s failure to protect its 
own population triggers a responsibility to protect in other states, this 
responsibility of third-party states must logically exist whether or not 
a politicized and highly veto-prone body chooses to acknowledge it 
or authorize particular actions. By extension, if the responsibility to 
protect is based on universal values and shared humanity, rather than 
the technicalities of citizenship and borders, third-party states that 
shirk their own responsibilities to protect might themselves be 
viewed as losing legitimacy. 
To be clear, this is far from a universally accepted understanding 
of R2P. It is, however, an understanding of R2P that’s “out there,” 
available for use and deployment by states and other actors.33 Will 
the United States or other states someday seek to justify a use of 
force on R2P grounds even if the Security Council doesn’t authorize 
force? There’s no way to know for sure, but I do not consider it 
implausible. After all, in 1999—before the advent of R2P—the 
United States, without Security Council blessing, intervened in 
 
 33. See Anne Peters, Humanity as the A and Ω of Sovereignty, 20 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 513, 513–14 (2009), available at http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/20/3/1849.pdf 
(arguing that a state’s sovereignty must be justified by its protection of basic 
human rights and that when a state grossly fails to fulfill these duties, its 
sovereignty is suspended, leaving the international community responsible to meet 
human needs); Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Rethinking 
Humanitarian Intervention, 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS 78, 82–
83 (2004) (contending that the case for conceiving of sovereignty as responsibility 
is strengthened by the increasing impact of international human rights norms and 
the extension of the concept of security from the state to people). 
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Kosovo. Then, as now in Syria, the threat of a Russian veto 
torpedoed any hope of UN authorization, but NATO acted anyway. I 
find it hard to doubt that the United States and its NATO allies 
would do the same again in the name of R2P, should circumstances 
in Syria or elsewhere come to seem sufficiently urgent. For now, 
prudential considerations have militated against the use of force in 
Syria, but this may yet change. 
B. COUNTERTERRORISM AND THE “UNWILLING OR UNABLE” TEST 
The Arab Spring took the R2P genie out of its bottle, but as I 
noted earlier, R2P is not the only sovereignty-limiting “emerging 
norm” to have surfaced in recent years. Looking at the post-9/11 
counter-terrorism discourse in the United States, we can see 
strikingly similar logic at play. (Indeed, the initial ICISS report on 
the Responsibility to Protect was thoroughly upstaged by history, 
coming only two months after the terrorist attacks of September 
2011.) Even as the NATO intervention in Kosovo was causing 
international lawyers to reevaluate old ideas about sovereignty and 
humanitarian imperatives, the 9/11 attacks caused a similar 
reevaluation of old ideas about sovereignty and the use of force in 
defense of self or others.  
The UN Charter laid out reasonably clear rules governing the use 
of force. Under the collective security regime created by the Charter, 
force was not to be used inside the territory of a sovereign state 
unless the state at issue consented, the Security Council authorized 
the use of force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, or the use of 
force was in self-defense following an “armed attack” as delineated 
by Article 51 of the UN Charter. Traditional interpretations of the 
right to self-defense enshrined in the Charter included the right of a 
state to use force to prevent an “imminent” attack, but for the most 
part states construed the idea of imminence relatively narrowly—
parallel, essentially, to the way most domestic jurisdictions 
understand self-defense and imminent threat.34 
The 9/11 attacks changed this. They laid bare the manner in which 
 
 34. See, e.g., John Bassett Moore, Destruction of the “Caroline,” in 2 DIG. 
INT’L L. 409, 412 (1906) (describing the exchange of diplomatic notes between 
Great Britain and the United States about whether the destruction of The Caroline 
by the British was a justified act of self-defense against piracy). 
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globalization and its drivers (changes in communication, 
transportation, and weapons technologies, for instance) had 
accelerated the movement of money and materiel and reduced the 
salience of international borders and state monopolies on the use of 
force. In an era in which threats emanating from one state’s territory 
can migrate almost instantly to another state’s territory, the logic of 
sovereign non-intervention principles loses force. Unsurprisingly, 
post-9/11 counterterrorism concerns triggered the rapid emergence of 
normative and legal arguments for expanding the basis for using 
force within the territory of other states.  
Within the national security community, there were generally two 
strands to these arguments. First, in the Bush Administration’s 
embrace of so-called “preemptive” self-defense, the traditional 
Charter-based justification for using force in self-defense was 
expanded and used to justify the war in Iraq. The logic underlying 
the Bush argument was straightforward (though the facts, 
inconveniently, were less so): in the age of ballistic missiles and 
nuclear, chemical, and biological threats, states may only have a 
moment’s notice (if any) before an imminent and devastating 
attack.35 Surely the framers of the UN Charter would not have 
required states to wait for such an attack to occur or be imminent in 
the traditional and restrictive sense before they could lawfully use 
force in self-defense—even if that meant using force inside another 
sovereign state’s territory! 
This extension of the principle of self-defense stretches traditional 
understandings of sovereignty—but the second strand of 
counterterrorism-based arguments justifying the use of force raises 
even more fundamental challenges to old notions of sovereignty. 
Consider drone strikes and other cross-border uses of force outside 
of so-called “hot” battlefields (e.g., outside places such as 
 
 35. See THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 15 (2002), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf (“We must adapt the 
concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries 
. . . . The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more 
compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if 
uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or 
prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, 
act preemptively.”). 
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Afghanistan and Iraq, where U.S. ground troops have been engaged). 
Since 2011, the United States has repeatedly used force inside the 
borders of sovereign states with which it is not in an armed conflict, 
at times without the consent of the affected state. In October 2008, 
for instance, U.S. troops in Iraq crossed over into Syria and attacked 
targets within Syria’s borders.36 The United States has also attacked 
targets inside Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and perhaps Mali and the 
Philippines.37 In some cases, the affected states—all, not 
coincidentally, with substantial Arab or Muslim populations—have 
consented to the United States’ use of force.38 In other cases, their 
consent is, at best, questionable.39  
 
 36. See CROSS-BORDER ATTACK ON SYRIA RAISES IRANIAN EYEBROWS, COUNCIL 
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (OCT. 30, 2008), HTTP://WWW.CFR.ORG/IRAN/CROSS-
BORDER-ATTACK-SYRIA-RAISES-IRANIAN-EYEBROWS/P17648. 
 37. See Osama bin Laden Killed in Pakistan, AL JAZEERA (May 2, 2011), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2011/05/2011522132275789.html; 
Charlie Savage, Relatives Sue U.S. Officials over U.S. Citizens Killed by Drone 
Strikes in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/19/ 
world/middleeast/us-officials-sued-over-citizens-killed-in-yemen.html; Deaths in 
US Drone Strikes in Somalia, AL JAZEERA (Feb. 25, 2012), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/02/201222505924775127.html; see 
also Afua Hirsch, Islamist Rebels Vow Assault on Malian Capital if International 
Forces Attack, GUARDIAN (Oct. 29, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
world/2012/oct/29/mali-africa (reporting that the United States’ combating Al 
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is a source of controversy in Mali and that 
surveillance drones are currently operating in the country); Alexis Romero, AFP 
Denies US Drone Attack in Phl, PHILIPPINE STAR (July 10, 2012), 
http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2012/07/10/826274/afp-denies-us-drone-attack-
phl (relaying that the armed forces of the Philippines deny allowing the United 
States to attack Indonesian terrorist Umar Patek in their territory and that, under 
Philippine law, the activity of U.S. soldiers is limited to information sharing and 
training). 
 38. See e.g., Greg Miller, In Interview, Yemeni President  
Acknowledges Approving U.S. Drone Strikes, WASH. POST (Sept. 29,  
2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/yemeni-president-
acknowledges-approving-us-drone-strikes/2012/09/29/09bec2ae-0a56-11e2-afff-
d6c7f20a83bf_story.html?hpid=z1. 
 39. One difficulty is raised by the fact that the affected state may agree in 
private to allow U.S. strikes but object in public. This, and the secrecy surrounding 
most of these strikes, makes it difficult to fully evaluate the degree to which 
consent has been obtained. See, e.g., Adam Entous et al., US Unease over Drone 
Strikes: Obama Administration Charts Delicate Legal Path Defending 
Controversial Weapons, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 26, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/ 
article/SB10000872396390444100404577641520858011452.html (reporting that, 
although Pakistan publicly opposes UAV strikes within its territory, the U.S. 
government infers Pakistan’s tacit consent to strikes when Pakistan’s intelligence 
  
2013] LESSONS FROM THE ARAB SPRING 727 
The United States has offered only the most minimal legal 
justification for these actions (even the existence of a CIA drone 
program remains classified), but the logic relied upon appears 
structurally identical to that embraced by proponents of the R2P: 
sovereign rights are accompanied by responsibilities; states must 
refrain from internal activities that threaten the citizens or basic 
security of other states, and must prevent non-state actors from 
engaging in such activities inside their borders. Thus, if a state 
supports or tolerates terrorists within its borders, it is failing to 
uphold its sovereign responsibilities, and other states are entitled to 
use force within its borders if doing so is necessary to protect 
themselves or uphold global security.40  
As President Obama’s chief counterterrorism advisor John 
Brennan stated in a 2011 speech, “[The United States] reserve[s] the 
right to take unilateral action if or when other governments are 
unwilling or unable to take the necessary actions themselves.”41 
Attorney General Eric Holder put forward a similar view in a March 
2012 speech: “Our government has both a responsibility and a right 
to protect this nation and its people.”42 And while “[i]nternational 
legal principles, including respect for another nation’s sovereignty, 
constrain our ability to act unilaterally. . . . the use of force in foreign 
territory would be consistent with these international legal principles 
if conducted, for example, with the consent of the nation involved – 
or after a determination that the nation [in which terrorists are 
present] is unable or unwilling to deal effectively with a threat to the 
United States.”43  
Although neither Brennan nor Holder acknowledges it, this view 
 
service is informed of and does not respond to U.S. plans). 
 40. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001) (Sept. 28, 2001) 
(noting that states must prevent and suppress, in their territories through all lawful 
means, the financing and preparation of any acts of terrorism). 
 41. John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. & 
Counterterrorism, Strengthening Our Security by Adhering to Our Values and 
Laws (Sept. 16, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-strengthening-our-security-adhering-
our-values-an. 
 42. Eric Holder, Att’y General, Address at Northwestern University School of 
Law (Mar. 5, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ 
ag-speech-1203051.html. 
 43. Id. 
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effectively makes a mockery of traditional claims about sovereign 
non-intervention. After all, the notion that force can be used inside a 
sovereign state if the state either consents or is viewed (by a third-
party state!) as “unwilling or unable” to “take the necessary actions” 
is entirely circular. If a state consents, the use of force by a third-
party state—the United States—is legally acceptable; if a state does 
not consent, however, in a situation in which the United States 
regards force as necessary, then—by definition—that state is 
“unwilling or unable” in the eyes of the United States, and force is 
also then legally acceptable. It’s difficult to see much left of the idea 
of sovereign non-intervention here. 
C. THE CONVERGENCE OF SOVEREIGNTY-LIMITING THEORIES 
Against a backdrop of turmoil in the Arab World, the human rights 
and national security discourses appear to be converging on 
structurally parallel sovereignty-limiting theories. Each has the effect 
of legitimizing and reinforcing the other, though neither the human 
rights community nor the national security community is inclined to 
acknowledge this.   
I believe the R2P coin ought logically be seen as having two sides: 
on one side lies a state’s duty to take action inside its own territory to 
protect its own population from violence and atrocities (this is the 
R2P beloved by the human rights community). On the other side lies 
a state’s duty to take action inside its own territory to protect other 
states’ populations from violence (this version of R2P remains 
submerged, but it’s the version embraced by many in the 
counterterrorism community, though they would never use the term 
R2P). On either side of the coin, a state that fails in its protective 
duties faces the prospect that other states will intervene in its 
“internal” affairs without its consent and, quite possibly, without the 
Security Council’s consent. 
To be clear, my purpose here is descriptive rather than 
prescriptive. I do not assert that any of this is either wise or close to 
being settled law. R2P’s scope, meaning, and legal status remain 
controversial, and the U.S. legal defense of recent drone strikes and 
other cross-border uses of force is even more so. Nonetheless, each 
of these normative frameworks is articulated with increasing 
frequency, each is couched in legal terms, and each offers the raw 
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materials from which states and other actors can construct legally 
plausible arguments. Whether the trend I have noted here is to be 
welcomed or condemned is beyond the scope of this article. But the 
existence of the trend is increasingly incontrovertible. 
II. CHANGING TECHNOLOGIES 
As noted earlier, the rapid evolution of these sovereignty-limiting 
doctrines has been paralleled (and perhaps enabled) by a similarly 
rapid evolution in technologies that collectively make cross-border 
uses of force less costly. Surveillance technologies have improved 
dramatically in the last two decades, enabling powerful states to 
more effectively and accurately determine the location, numbers, and 
motivations of actors they deem to pose security threats—or the 
actors engaged in atrocities against civilians. Weapons technologies 
and delivery systems have also improved, enabling greater precision 
in targeting and less collateral damage. And the development of 
increasingly sophisticated UAVs not only assists with intelligence 
gathering and precision targeting, but eliminates any immediate risk 
to the military or intelligence personnel who control them.  
Taken together, these technological changes reduce the risks and 
costs of using force inside the borders of other sovereign states. 
Unmanned aerial vehicles in particular have become a game-changer 
for the United States: they’re substantially cheaper to make and 
maintain than manned aircraft; they can spend much more “time on 
target,” which increases the likelihood that a given strike will hit 
only its intended target (rather than nearby civilians, for instance); 
and their use poses no risk to their operators, who remain safely far 
from the strike zone.44 
Compared to the methods available even fifteen years ago, today’s 
surveillance and weapons technologies permit states to use force at 
lower cost in both monetary and human terms. When targets are 
limited and well-defined, states no longer need to risk the lives of 
ground troops or human pilots to strike targets, and they can feel 
 
 44. See generally Bradley J. Strawser, Moral Predators: The Duty to Employ 
Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles, 9 J. MIL. ETHICS 342 (2010) (advocating an ethical 
duty to employ UAVs when military action is justified because UAVs are cost 
effective, are accurate in discriminating between combatant and noncombatant, 
and eliminate risks to operators). 
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more confident that there will be no significant civilian deaths (thus 
reducing the odds of international condemnation). Strikes become 
more “surgical.” And this seems likely to produce changes in state 
behavior: if states perceive the costs of using force to be lower, their 
willingness to use force will be higher.  
III. WHEN LEGAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL 
TRENDS INTERSECT: IMPLICATIONS  
When sovereignty-limiting theories such as R2P and the 
“unwilling or unable” counterterrorism framework are available to 
states, the perceived reputational costs of using force inside the 
borders of other sovereign states will go down. Combine these 
normative and doctrinal developments with technological changes 
that reduce the financial and human cost of using of force inside 
other states’ borders, and the threshold for using force will get lower 
still.  
None of this was caused by the Arab Spring, but these changes 
have played out primarily against its backdrop. The Libya 
intervention became the proving ground for R2P, and the U.S.-
NATO intervention was enabled not only by the existence of this 
permissive doctrine, but also by the relatively new ability to employ 
UAVs for precision airstrikes. Had the United States and NATO 
been forced to rely solely on traditional air power—with its need for 
vulnerable human targets and its trade-offs between ensuring the 
safety of flight crews and flying low enough for accurate target 
identification—it is possible the Libya intervention might never have 
occurred. The availability of UAVs—which were relied upon heavily 
during the Libya intervention—enabled the Obama Administration to 
launch a relatively cheap and “risk-free” war, easily bypassing 
domestic legal strictures such as the War Powers Act (with no troops 
on the ground and no “fighting,” the Administration could plausibly 
claim that the War Powers Act did not apply).45 
 
 45. See Nick Hopkins, British Pilots Flew Armed US Drones in Libya, MoD 
Reveals, GUARDIAN (July 26, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jul/26/ 
british-pilots-drones-libya (reporting that, between April and October 2011, NATO 
and the United States conducted 145 UAV strikes in Libya); see also Charlie 
Savage & Mark Landler, White House Defends Continuing U.S. Role in Libya 
Operation, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/16/us/ 
politics/16powers.html?_r=0 (describing U.S. President Obama’s position that the 
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Similarly, the Arab and Muslim World has also been the proving 
ground for counterterrorism-based sovereignty-limiting theories. 
Here too, the presence both of enabling legal discourses and 
technologies rendering the use of force safe and economical has led 
to an increase in the use of force. The growing acceptance of 
sovereignty-limiting doctrines has muted international legal criticism 
of U.S. drone strikes, while the availability of UAVs has tempted the 
United States to go after an ever-expanding list of targets, from 
Yemen and Pakistan to Somalia.  
The emergence of sovereignty-limiting doctrines and more 
permissive theories about the use of force reflects changed facts on 
the ground. Sometimes states engage in such egregious atrocities 
against their own populations that morality, if not law, appears to 
demand a response. Sometimes states will be unwilling or unable to 
take action against terrorist groups operating inside their borders, 
even when those groups pose a grave threat to the populations of 
other states. In an age in which technologies, money, people, and 
materiel can cross borders rapidly and easily, it seems unreasonable 
to expect those states that are threatened to stand idly by—
particularly when new weapons technologies appear to enable swift, 
controlled, and effective responses.  
The clock can’t be turned back—yet these linked normative and 
technological developments raise obvious and glaring issues for 
those concerned with the international rule of law. Whether a 
potential use of force is justified on counterterrorism grounds or on 
humanitarian and human rights grounds, the slippery slope is 
apparent. Who gets to judge when a state should be deemed to have 
“waived” its sovereignty and abrogated its responsibilities? Who gets 
to decide when a use of force inside the border of a non-consenting 
state is lawful? How much force is acceptable? And which actors get 
to use force? A single state acting unilaterally? Regional 
organizations? Coalitions of the willing? If each state begins to claim 
the right to judge for itself when force can be used inside the borders 
of another state, the world will become an even more frightening and 
unstable place, given the continued weakness of most existing 
international institutions.  
 
War Powers Resolution does not apply to its involvement in Libya). 
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Whether the international legal community will get serious about 
the difficult project of developing alternate forms of restraint and 
accountability remains to be seen. But in decades to come, when we 
look back upon the recent turbulence in the Arab World, we may 
recall it less for the political changes it brought about within Arab 
states than for the changes in normative conceptions of sovereignty 
and the use of force that accompanied it.  
 
